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1. Introduction 
 
Efficient allocation of capital to high-growth startup companies is recognized as 
one of the most important challenges confronting capital markets as asymmetric 
information between founders and investors often lead to market failure.  By unifying 
ownership and control, venture capitalists open the flow of funds between arm’s length 
investors (e.g. pension funds, insurance companies, and other corporations) and 
entrepreneurs.  The greatest impact of venture capital financing on economies around the 
world is undoubtedly manifested in the data on Initial Public Offerings (IPOs).  Public 
firms, in contrast to private firms, operate under a completely different corporate 
structure.   
In this paper we examine whether venture-capital backing affects the quality of 
financial reporting in the post-IPO period.  In particular, we seek to investigate whether 
new public firms efficiently make the transition from being a private company to a public 
one.  In addition, we are interested in analyzing whether there are any long term 
economic consequences associated with the choice of obtaining venture capital financing. 
 We address these issues by exploring newly public firms’ ability to credibly 
communicate public financial information to diffused arm’s length investors.  Our main 
hypothesis, predicts that the degrees of control and ownership by venture capitalists 
affect public firms’ financial information credibility and thus its quality as manifested 
in…..informativeness.  Most research to date has focused and documented the benefits 
associated with receiving venture capital financing.  However, to the extent that 
information asymmetries exacerbate agency problems, we interpret our results as 
suggesting that these benefits are not without costs. 
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 Throughout the paper, we deploy two methods, widely used in the accounting 
literature, to measure the informativeness of earnings.  First, we focus on the slope 
coefficients relating annual stock returns to levels of earnings and changes in the levels of 
reported earnings.  In addition, we also examine investors’ reaction to quarterly earnings 
announcements.  Viewing the informativeness of earnings as a measure for the market 
participants’ confidence in the accounting information is not new (e.g. Teoh and Wong 
[1993]).1  Second, we investigate the extent to which stock prices reflect the relative 
dependence on current and future earnings, and adopt the approach discussed in Kothari 
and Sloan [1992].  The underlying premise is that when firms can credibly communicate 
with investors (in any form, be it public financial reports or not) then stock prices reflect 
future earnings to a greater extent.  Consistent with our prediction, we find the opposite 
for venture capital backed firms.  Our findings throughout the study are robust to 
controlling for the endogenous choice of venture capital.   
 We examine venture capitalists’ incentives to manage the flow of public 
information to capital market participants.  Specifically, in the model presented in the 
next section, reported earnings can be manipulated by insiders (e.g. venture capitalists) 
and thus may not represent the true underlying economic fundamentals of the firm 
(Lacker and Weinberg [1989]).  In equilibrium, venture capitalists’ incentives to 
manipulate earnings are determined by the equity prices that follow earnings 
announcements.  Anticipating this behavior, uninformed investors value firm equity 
while taking into account the (endogenous) informativeness of earnings (Holthausen and 
Verrecchia [1988]).  Our model predicts the informativeness of earnings to (i) be higher 
                                                 
1 Teoh and Wong [1993] analysis shows a positive relation between the credibility of accounting 
information and informativeness, interpreted as the coefficient estimate which relates stock returns to 
reported earnings. 
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for non-venture backed firms relative to venture capital backed firms, (ii) be higher when 
the equity ownership of the venture capital firm is lower, and (iii) be higher when the 
board representation of the venture capital is lower. 
 Two main forces drive the theoretical results.  First, venture capitalists play an 
active role in the development of the firms they finance.  In the process, as a 
consequence, probably more than other investor, venture capitalists acquire private 
information regarding the firm’s products, the potential product markets, the expected 
profits, among other things.  For instance, venture capitalists often offer valuable 
consulting services (Gompers and Lerner [1999], Sahlman [1990]), have board 
representation and substantial control rights (Kaplan and Stomberg [2002]), shape and at 
times replace the management team (Hellman and Puri [2002]), and thoroughly screen 
and monitor the firms in the pre-funding stage. 
 Second, like pension funds, insurance companies, corporations and other 
institutional investors, venture capitalists own a substantial fraction of firm equity (Barry, 
Muscarella, and Vetsuypens [1990]).  However, venture capital funds are unique in that 
they are (by law) limited in life span, and exist only for a period of ten to twelve years 
(Gompers and Lerner [1999], Sahlman [1990]).  Therefore, among the equity holders and 
other decision makers in the newly public firm, venture capitalists may be more 
interested in advancing short-term performance at the expense of long-term growth.2  It is 
this specific conflict of interests arising from the limited investment and ownership 
horizon facing venture capital investors that we view as the potential cost associated with 
obtaining venture capital financing, as they might lead to inefficient decisions and reduce 
                                                 
2 The compensation of venture capitalists typically depends on the fund’s proceeds upon liquidation, i.e. the 
short-term performance of their investments (Gompers and Lerner [1999]). 
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the overall firm value.  This is in particular true when venture capitalists benefit the most 
from a profitable exit (e.g. when they own a substantial fraction of firm equity) and when 
they can more easily affect firm decisions, for instance, when they have substantial 
voting power or board representation. 
 The evidence we document suggest that the reported earnings of venture backed 
firms are less informative than earnings of non-venture-backed firms.  We report the 
results after controlling for other determinants of earnings informativeness, such as firm 
size, loss observations, the book-to-market ratio, and leverage.  We find that investors 
react less to a unit of unexpected earnings for venture backed firms and that the reaction 
depends on the incentives of the venture capitalist to manipulate earnings.  Consistent 
with the model’s predictions, we find that more equity the venture capitalist owns and the 
more board seats held by the venture capitalist, the less informative earnings are. 
 Out study contributes to two streams of research.  First, we contribute to the 
literature which examines the role of financial intermediaries and in particular venture 
capitalists in the firms they invest in.  Prior research has documented the economic 
consequences of venture capital financing, for example, the underpricing of IPOs 
(Magginson and Weiss [1991], Lee and Wahal [2002]), product market behavior 
(Hellman and Puri [2000]), corporate governance (Hochberg [2004]), and long-term 
returns (Brav and Gompers [1997]).  We add to this literature by documenting the 
adverse effects venture capitalists have on the firm’s informational environment 
subsequent to its going public.3  Second, we extend prior research which examines 
                                                 
3 In a recent study, Hand [2005] examines the value relevance of financial statement data and non-financial 
data in the pre-IPO venture capital market and post-IPO market.  Hand [2005] finds that for a sample of 
193 biotechnology companies, financial statements are value relevant in the pre-IPO market.  While both 
Hand [2005] and our study seeks to better understand the structure and characteristics of the information 
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factors affecting the credibility of reported accounting earnings, as captured by the 
coefficient relating stock returns to earnings.  Examples of such studies include Teoh and 
Wong [1993], Imhoff and Lobo [1992], Warfield, Wild, and Wild [1995], Subramanyam 
and Wild [1996], Fan and Wong [2002], Gul and Wah [2002], and Francis et al. [2005].  
In particular, we extend the findings of studies which focused on the relation between 
ownership structure and control and the informativeness of earnings (e.g. Warfield et al. 
[1995], Fan and Wong [2002], and Francis et al. [2005]).  We show that the ownership 
structure of newly public firms, in particular the presence of a venture capitalist, is an 
important determinant of the informativeness of earnings. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 a simple model, 
upon which our empirical analysis builds on, is presented.  Section 3 describes the data 
and the methodology used to estimate the informativeness of earnings, while in section 4 
we discuss our findings.  In Section 5 we deploy a second methodology to address our 
research question.  Section 6 discusses the robustness of our results when including 
ownership by other institutional investors.  We conclude in section 7. 
 
2. A simple Model 
 Consider a public firm that exists for three periods, t=0, 1, 2 and is endowed with 
a risky project.  The project yields in period t=2, Revenues R, where R = U with 
probability p and R=D otherwise (U>D).  For simplicity, we assume that this project is 
                                                                                                                                                 
environment of newly public firms, the studies differ in their specific research questions and research 
design.  In particular, while Hand is interested in the value relevance of financial information in the private 
equity market, we investigate how venture capitals manage the flow of public information, and thus affect 
the informativeness of earnings versus non-ventured backed firms.  We further discuss these issues in 
section 4. 
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the only asset of the firm and that revenues are net of payments to any debt holders.  A 
venture capitalist (VC) is endowed with equity share α ∈(0, 1) in the firm. 
 Three properties of venture capitalists are emphasized in this study.  First, venture 
capitalists are not long-term investors and eventually unwind their equity positions prior 
to the pre-specified liquidation date of their fund.  Second, venture capitalists are 
informed investors.  And third, venture capitalists can manage the flow of public 
accounting information received by capital markets participants by creating opacity 
regarding firm prospects (as discussed and formalized below). 
 In the model, the venture capitalist (VC) is required to sell his ownership of firm 
equity at time t=2, while having private information regarding the distribution of future 
cash flows.  The VC’s private information, at this point, is summarized by a signal (with 
perfect precision) regarding the state of the firm.  In other words, the VC knows if 
revenues will be U or D next period.  The VC can manipulate the public signal regarding 
the true state of the firm sp, by costly creating “opacity” at level oi ∈[0,1] in states of the 
world i = U, D. 
 
 Prob (sp = U | R = U, o) =  Prob (sp = D | R = D, o) = 1-o 
 
Thus, if there is no opacity (in other words, full transparency), i.e. o=0, then there is no 
private information and the public is fully informed.  However, as we will show, this is 
not characterized as an equilibrium.  Finally, let βc(o) denote the cost to the VC of 
creating the opacity level o∈[0,1], where c`(0) = 0, c`(o) ≥ 0, c``(o) > 0, and 
∞=→ )(lim 1 oco .  The coefficient β is strictly positive and represents the control of the 
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VC.  Specifically, when the VC has substantial control in the firm, the cost of 
manipulation is lower, i.e. β is lower. 
 
2.1 Equilibrium 
 Consider first the problem of the VC at period t=1.  The optimal level of opacity, 
o, maximizes the expected price of firm equity.  Therefore, it will not be optimal for the 
VC to create opacity when a good signal is received, i.e. R = U.  Denote by o* the level 
of opacity the VC chooses in equilibrium when a bad signal is received, i.e. R = D.  The 
publicly observed equity prices are based on public information.   
Thus, we can write the price of equity at time t=1 as a function of public 
information, P (sp).  Also, let P0 = pU + (1-p)D denote the price of equity at the outset 
(time t=0) when there is symmetric information.   
The equilibrium level of opacity solves: 
 
MAX
o )1,0(∈
  )()],|(Pr)(),|(Pr)([ ocoDRDsobDPoDRUsobUP pp βα −==+==  (1) 
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The equilibrium is implicitly given by: 
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We can now define the price reaction to good news, ∆U, as the change in the price of 
equity as a result of the release of a good signal: 
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Proposition 1:  
(a) Manipulation takes place in equilibrium at level o*>0 defined by the equilibrium 
in equation (3). 
(b) The degree of manipulation increases in VC ownership and in VC control, i.e.  
0* >∂
∂
α
o  and 0* <∂
∂
β
o . 
(c) The price reaction ∆U is decreasing in VC ownership, i.e. 0<∂
Δ∂
α
U . 
(d) The price reaction, ∆U is decreasing in VC control, i.e. 0>∂
Δ∂
β
U . 
Proof: Follows from the above.       ▄ 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 In this section we compare the informativeness of earnings between venture and 
non-venture-backed firms and within the groups of venture backed firms.  We define 
informativeness of earnings as the slope coefficient relating stock returns to reported 
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accounting earnings, obtained from regressions of annual stock returns on annual 
earnings, and from short window returns analysis of quarterly earnings announcements.   
 Our approach builds on Teoh and Wong’s [1993] analysis which shows a positive 
relation between the credibility of reported accounting information and informativeness, 
measured as the coefficient relating stock returns to earnings.  Based on Proposition 1, we 
test the following hypotheses: 
H1: Reported earnings are equally informative for venture and non-venture-backed 
firms. 
H2: The informativeness of reported earnings does not vary with the venture 
capitalist’s ownership of firm equity. 
H3: The informativeness of reported earnings does not vary with the venture 
capitalist’s representation on the firm’s board of directors. 
 
In order to focus on the implications of venture capital financing for the 
informativeness of earnings, we address the endogeneity of ownership structure.  The 
decision of a firm to receive venture capital funding and the decision of a venture 
capitalist to provide such financing are not exogenous.  Firm specific characteristics and 
information attributes may determine which firms are eventually venture capital backed.   
Therefore, the apparent endogeneity makes the issues of estimating the impact of venture 
capital financing on earnings informativeness challenging.  To address this problem, we 
use an instrumental variables approach, following other studies in the existing literature 
(e.g. Baker and Gompers [2003]).  We use two instruments for venture capital financing. 
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The first instrument is the state where the firm is located.  This information is 
obtained from COMPUSTAT.  The motivation for using this variable as an instrument 
for venture capital is the concentration of the venture capital industry in several states, 
such as, California, Massachusetts, Texas, and Washington.  This exact instrument was 
used by Baker and Gompers [2003], among others, in their study examining CEO 
compensation and venture capital financing.  The second instrumental variable we are 
using is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm was founded after the year 1979.  The 
amendment to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1979, allowing pension 
funds to invest in venture capital partnerships, had a significant impact on money flowing 
into venture capital funds (Gompers and Lerner [1999]).  This suggests that the 
probability of a firm being venture capital backed increased subsequently to 1979.  We 
report the results using both ordinary least squares and instrumental variables regressions.  
 We estimate the earnings informativeness association for samples that combine 
both venture and non-venture backed firms, and include the following factors which have 
been shown by prior research both to differ between venture and non-venture-backed 
firms and to be related to earnings informativeness. 
Market-to-Book Ratio:  This ratio serves as a proxy for investment opportunities.  
Collins and Kothari [1989] find that the book-to-market ratio is negatively associated 
with earnings informativeness; we include this variable in our regressions to control 
for the effect of investments opportunities on earnings informativeness. 
 Leverage:  Dhaliwal, Lee, and Fargher [1991] document that the coefficient relating 
earnings to stock returns is decreasing in financial leverage.  Thus, we need to 
condition for leverage in our informativeness tests. 
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Size:  Consistent with prior research (e.g. Jiambalvo et al. [2002], among others) we 
control for size when testing the relation between stock returns and earnings.  We 
expect that the coefficient estimate relating earnings to stock returns is increasing in 
the firm’s size. 
Loss: We include a dummy variable for loss observations since Hayn [1995] provides 
evidence that the coefficient estimates relating stock returns and earnings are smaller 
for loss observations. 
Hi-Tech: To address any concerns associated with the unique features of the high-
tech industry and their implications for earnings informativeness, we identify firms in 
the high-tech industry by including a dummy variable. 
 
3.1 Test of Earnings Informativeness 
 We start our analysis of the differential informativeness of earnings for venture 
and non-venture-backed firms by examining the slope coefficients from regressions of 
annual stock returns on annual earnings.  Following Easton and Harris [1991], we report 
tests for the level and changes in earnings.  We include control variables for the market-
to-book ratio, size, leverage, and whether earnings are positive, since these variables have 
been shown to influence earnings informativeness.  The main regression we estimate is 
given in equation (5): 
ηααα
αα
ααααα
++++
++
Δ+Δ+++=
LEVEARNMBEARNSIZEEARN
HTECHEARNLOSSEARN
VCEARNEARNVCEARNEARNR
titititititi ti
titititi
tititititititi
,,9,,8,,7 ,
,,6,,5
,,4,3,,2,10,
***
***
**
        (5) 
Where: 
R ti,  = firm i’s 12-month cumulative raw return for fiscal year t.  The 12-month interval 
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          starts three months following the end of the fiscal year t-1 and ends three months  
          after the end of fiscal year t.4   
EARN ti, = firm i’s annual earnings (before extraordinary items) for fiscal year t, scaled by  
market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
EARN tiΔ , = change in EARN ti, between year t-1 and year t, scaled by market value of 
equity at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
VC ti, = venture capital backing dummy variable equal to one if the company is venture  
 capital backed, zero otherwise. 
LOSS ti , =dummy variable equal to one if EARNi,t <0.  
HTECH ti, = dummy variable equal to one if SIC code belongs to 2833-2836, 8731-8734,  
7371-7379, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, zero otherwise. 
SIZE ti, = the log of firm’s i market value of equity in year t.   
MB ti, = Market-to-Book ratio, the ratio of firm i’s market value of equity to their book  
value of equity at the end of year.   
LEV ti, = firm’s leverage, defined as the ratio of firm i’s long term debt to total book value  
of assets at the end of year t-1. 
 
Under the null hypothesis H1, α 2 +α 4 =0; less earnings informativeness implies 
α 2 +α 4 <0 and greater earnings informativeness implies α 2 +α 4 >0.   
 Our second test of H1 examines the market reaction of venture backed firms 
versus non-backed firms to the earnings news conveyed in quarterly earnings 
announcements.  Using Compustat quarterly earnings announcement dates and CRSP 
beta-adjusted abnormal returns, we calculate the three-day cumulative abnormal return 
for all quarterly earnings announcements during 1975-2003 made by our sample firms.  
We use a seasonal random walk model to measure unexpected earnings.  We test the 
                                                 
4 We obtain similar results (not tabulated) if we cumulate stock returns over the 15-month period starting at 
the end of year t-1. 
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differential sensitivity of returns to unexpected earnings for venture capital backed firms 
and non-backed firms by estimating equation (6), where the null hypothesis predicts 
that 02 =λ : 
νλλλ tqitqitqitqi VCUEUECAR ,,,,2,,10,, * +++=                      (6) 
 
Where: 
 
CAR tqi ,, = cumulative abnormal return over the three days (-1, 1) centered on firm i’s  
announcement of quarter q earnings for year t. 
UE tqi ,, = unexpected earnings of quarter q earnings for year t, measured as the difference  
between reported earnings for quarter q of year t and reported earnings for quarter  
q of year t-1, scaled by the share price at the end of the prior fiscal quarter.5 
 
3.2 Conditional Tests of Earnings Informativeness  
In this section we test how venture capital ownership and the board of directors’ 
characteristics affect the informativeness of earnings for a reduced sample of venture 
backed firms.  We estimate the following two regressions: 
ηα
ααα
ααα
ααααα
tititi
titititititi
titititititi
tititititititi
SEATEARN
SEATEARNOWNEARNOWNEARN
LEVEARNMBEARNSIZEEARN
HTECHEARNLOSSEARNEARNEARNR
,,,11
,,10,,9,,8
,,7,,6,,5
,,4,,3,2,10,
**
***
***
***
+Δ+
+Δ++
++++
++Δ++=
       (7) 
υλλλλ tititqititqitqitqi SEATUEOWNUEUECAR ,,,,3,,,2,,10,, ** ++++=                     (8) 
 
Where 
                                                 
5 We also scaled by the market value of equity 30 days prior to the earnings announcements, for 
observations where share price was available on this particular date.  The results (untabulated) are not 
sensitive to this alternative specification. 
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OWNi,t = percentage of equity owned by venture capital firms at date of IPO.   
SEATi,t  = percentage of seats on board of directors occupied by venture capital firms 
 
3.3 Data and Sample 
The analysis is based on data obtained from the following data sources: the 2003 
Compustat annual and quarterly industrial and research files, the 2003 CRSP files, and 
SDC for 1975-2003.  Unit offerings and IPOs with an offer price of less than $5.00 are 
not included in our sample.  We eliminated IPOs for which we could not identify valid 
CUSIP numbers.  These criteria results in a main sample which consists of 6,670 IPOs 
for which we have both financial data and stock return data.  Data for the reduced venture 
backed sample we use in the second part of the analysis is based on the Barry et al. 
[1990] venture capital data for the period 1978-1987.  The main sample consists of 2,202 
venture backed IPOs versus 4,468 non-backed IPOs.  We obtain the venture backing 
classification from SDC.  For the reduced sample of venture backed IPOs, we have 423 
firms with ownership and board of directors characteristics.   
 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics  
 Table 1 documents the industry distribution of venture backed IPOs across 2-digit 
SIC codes.  Across all industries, venture backed IPOs represent 34% of all IPOs.  This 
figure is very close to the 37% venture backed sample used in a recent study by Lee and 
Wahal [2004].  There is a significant variation across industries, from a zero in the 
Petroleum industry (SIC code 28) to a high of 55% in the Business Services (SIC code 
73).  In a finer analysis we find a large concentration of venture backed IPOs in SIC code 
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7372 – software firms (15%) and in the biotechnology industry (SIC code 8731, among 
others – 8%).   
 Table 2 reports the geographic distribution of venture backed IPOs.  We find that 
the most venture backed IPOs are concentrated in California, Massachusetts, and Texas.  
These three states represent more than 50% of the overall venture backed IPOs.  This 
concentration is not surprising given that prior research has documented that venture 
capital backed firms are located closer to areas where private equity markets are more 
developed.  Usually, the interpretation for such a finding is that venture capital firms 
want to closely monitor their investments, thus increasing the concentration of venture 
backed firms in those specific geographical areas. 
 Table 3 reports specific firm characteristic of venture backed versus non backed 
firms.  Venture backed firms have higher market values, smaller assets and lower book 
values, less sales revenues, and are less leveraged.  In addition, venture backed firms are 
more likely to report negative earnings compared to non backed firms. 
 
4. Results 
The results of estimating equation (5) are reported in Table 4.  Consistent with 
prior research, the annual regression relating stock returns to the level and change in 
earnings provides positive coefficient estimates (both significant at the 0.001 significance 
level).  In line with the results documented in Collins and Kothari [1989], we find that the 
coefficient estimate for the interaction between earnings and the market-to-book ratio is 
positive.  We also find that earnings informativeness is decreasing in leverage.  This 
finding is consistent with firms having greater incentives to manage earnings in the 
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presence of covenant restrictions associated with leverage which makes earnings quality, 
and thus earnings response coefficients lower for firms which are more leveraged.  
Finally, we find, as one would expect, that venture backed firms in the high-tech 
industries have less informative earnings, as suggested by the negative and significant 
coefficient   6
^α . 
With respect to our main variables of interest, EARN*VC and ∆EARN*VC, the 
estimates of 2
^α and 4^α are –0.260 and –0.323 respectively.  The sum of the two 
coefficient estimates is – -0.583, p-value of 0.0001.  These results support our hypothesis 
that the earnings of venture backed firms are less credible and thus providing a lower 
level of informativeness.  In terms of the magnitude of these effects, a one unit variation 
in the change in earnings is about half as informative for venture backed firms as it is for 
non-venture backed firms.  Columns two and three in Table 4 report the results when we 
use an instrumental variable in lieu of the venture capital dummy.  When we use as 
instruments the geographic location of the firm or the dummy for the year of founding, 
we find results which are consistent with the previous findings documented in column 
one of Table 4. 
  Our next test of Hypothesis H1 investigates the capital market’s reaction to the 
earnings news conveyed in quarterly earnings announcements of venture backed firms 
and non-venture backed firms.  The results estimating equation (6) are reported in Table 
5.  Consistent with prior research, we find a positive and significant value of unexpected 
earnings (UE).  The coefficient estimate
^
2λ , which is significantly negative suggests that 
investors respond less to a unit of unexpected earning for venture backed firms than for 
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non backed venture firms (-0.067, t-statistic -6.94).   Comparing the estimates 
^
1λ and 
^
2λ suggests that quarterly earnings announcements are about half as informative for 
venture backed firms relative to non-venture backed firms.  Repeating the analysis using 
the instrumental variables, rather than the venture capital dummy, provides the same 
results.  Overall, these results suggest that venture capital backing decreases the valuation 
weigh investors place on reported earnings of such firms.   
 In Table 5, Panel B, we further explore the relation between venture capital 
ownership and the informativeness of earnings for the sub-sample of high-tech firms.  In 
particular, we add the variable AGE to equation (6), which is defined as the logarithm of 
the number of months since the company became public.  By doing so, we can explore 
the changes in the informativeness of earnings as the firms become more mature.  For 
non-venture backed firms the informativeness of earnings is not affected by the variable 
AGE.  However, the informativeness of earnings increases in the period following the 
IPO for venture backed firms.  We view this as evidence of a gradual increase in 
informativeness due to the gradual decrease in venture capitalists’ ownership of firm 
equity, in the period following the IPO.  For the main sample, however, we did not find a 
significant difference in the effect of the firm’s maturity on the informativeness of 
earnings.  
 The evidence in Table 5, Panel B, is consistent with the results reported in Hand 
[2005].  He finds that the value relevance of financial statements increases as the firm 
matures and suggests that this is due to the increasing intensity of assets in place relative 
to future investment options.  Given his focus on a sample of biotechnology firms, 
Hand’s evidence is similar to our finding, for the more general high-tech industry.  
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4.1 Venture Capital Ownership and Earnings Informativeness 
We test hypotheses H2 and H3 by focusing on the reduced sample of venture 
backed firms as in Barry et al. [1990].  Results are reported in Table 6, Panels A and B.    
The evidence in Table 6, Panel A suggests that while EARN and ∆EARN are still 
positive and significant (as for our main sample), venture capital ownership decreases the 
informativeness of earnings.  In addition, we find that the larger the influence and control 
of venture capital firms on the boards of directors, as evidenced in the percent of the seats 
they have on the board, the lower the informativeness of earnings.  When we include both 
the ownership variable (OWN) and the board influence variable (SEAT), we find that 
only the SEAT variable continues to significantly decrease the informativeness of 
earnings, after controlling for the ownership stake of the venture capitalist.  Table 6, 
Panel B presents the results of testing how board characteristics and venture capital 
ownership affects the market’s reaction to quarterly earnings announcements.  In line 
with the results we report in Table 6, Panel A, we find that the higher the ownership stake 
of venture capital funds and the more influence these funds have on the board of 
directors, the less the market reacts to the earnings news signal as conveyed in the 
quarterly earnings announcement.  As in Panel A, only the SEAT variable is significant 
once both variables – OWN and SEAT are interacted with UE (unexpected earnings).   
Overall, the results in Table 6 suggest that as the ownership of venture capitalists 
increases, capital markets’ investors decrease the valuation weight on earnings.  While 
some of the control variables account for the variation in earnings informativeness, a 
significant portion is still unexplained by these variables.  We conclude that the 
unexplained portion in earnings informativeness is attributed to investors perceptions that 
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venture capitalists influence the public financial reporting process in such ways that 
reduces the credibility of earnings and thus its informativeness.   
The empirical evidence to date is mixed regarding the association between 
ownership structure and earnings informativeness.  On one hand, Warfield et al. [1995] 
find a positive relation between managerial ownership and earnings informativeness, 
whereas Fan and Wong [2002] find a negative relation between ownership and earnings 
informativeness for their sample of East Asian firms with concentrated ownership.6  
Related to these studies, Francis et. al [2005] do not find evidence that management 
ownership affects earnings informativeness for their specific sample.   
Taken as a whole, the results documented so far indicate that there is a long-term 
cost associated with being backed by venture capital financing.  In particular, one 
implication of these results is that venture capital backed firms have information related 
problems which might affect their ability to raise capital in the future.  The specific test 
of this assertion is left for future research.   
 
5. An Alternative Test of Communication Efficiency 
As in Jiambalvo et al. [2002] who examine the influence of institutional investors 
on the informativeness of earnings, we assess the extent to which stock prices lead 
accounting earnings conditional on venture capital backing.  Specifically, we examine 
whether the stock prices of venture-capital backed firms impound more or less 
information about current earnings relative to future earnings.  If venture capitalists are 
characterized as transient investors who are more concerned with current short term-
                                                 
6 In particular, Fan and Wong [2002] find that concentrated ownership, created by cross holdings and 
pyramid structures that separate cash flow rights from voting rights, decreases the informativeness of 
earnings.   
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profitability they will lack any incentives to become informed regarding the future 
prospects of the firm they are invested in.  Stated differently, venture capitalists will 
focus only on current earnings as a measure of profitability.  If venture capitalists are 
over focusing and emphasize short-term profitability as reflected in current reported 
earnings instead of future profitability, we might expect that stock prices of venture-
backed firms will reflect more information contained in current reported earnings relative 
to the information contained in future earnings.  The main motivation for investigating 
these empirical predictions is due to the limited investment and ownership horizon faced 
by venture capitalists.  As we stated earlier, venture capitalists are required by law to 
liquidate their equity holdings and exit the newly public firms they have invested in 
during a specific time frame. 
In order to examine the extent to which stock prices reflect the relative 
dependence on current and future earnings, we adopt the approach discussed in Kothari 
and Sloan [1992].  It is well known that stock prices lead earnings since not all the 
economic actions undertaken by the firm are reflected in current earnings but such 
actions are available and known to investors.  These economic actions, although known 
to investors and not reflected in current reported earnings will be reflected in future 
earnings.  Under this scenario, if investors impound value-relevant information which is 
not reflected in current earnings, current stock prices will reflect the information 
regarding future earnings, after controlling for current earnings.   
 Kothari and Sloan [1992] use the premise that stock prices lead accounting 
earnings and suggest the following association: 
 υθθ τ
τ
ττ −
−
− ++= it
it
it
tit
P
ER )(10,               (9) 
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Where: 
R tit τ−,  = The buy-and-hold return for firm i over the period t-τ to t. 
Eit   = Income before extraordinary items for the accounting period ended at time t. 
Pit τ−  = The stock price at the end of period t-τ. 
The capital market’s response during the period t-τ to t to accounting earnings 
information for the period ended at time t is represented byθ τ )(1 . 
 The discussion in Kothari and Sloan [1992] suggests that as the interval τ 
increases, more information contained in reported earnings at time t would be reflected in 
the return cumulated over the period t- τ to t.  This is the case since the capital market’s 
expectation about future profitability will be reflected earlier in stock prices but only later 
in reported accounting earnings.  If the information contained in current reported earnings 
has been already reflected in stock prices in the previous period, the coefficient θ τ )(1  will 
get smaller (larger) as the interval τ gets smaller (larger).  This implies that θ τ )(1 when τ=2 
is larger than for τ=1.  The ratio of θ τ )(1 obtained for a longer time interval to the one 
obtained for a shorter interval (i.e., θ
θ
τ
τ
)1(1
)2(1
=
= ) will provide a measure of the firm’s 
information environment.  The higher the ratio is, the more information in current 
reported earnings has already been reflected in previous stock returns. 
 If venture capitalists can be classified as transient investors who myopically focus 
on short term reported accounting earnings given their limited investment and ownership 
horizon, one would expect the ratio θ
θ
τ
τ
)1(1
)2(1
=
= to be smaller for venture-backed firms than for 
non-backed firms.  In other words, stock prices of venture backed firms would be more 
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sensitive to current reported earnings relative to future earnings than stock prices of non-
backed firms.  To investigate this prediction, we estimate the coefficient θ τ )(1  separately 
for venture-backed firms and non-backed firms for τ=1 and for τ=2.  Next, we calculate 
the ratio θ
θ
τ
τ
)1(1
)2(1
=
= for each group and test whether ratio is lower for the venture-backed 
firms.  A smaller ratio for venture-backed firms compared to the non-backed firms is 
consistent with the assertion that venture capital investors can be classified as transient 
investors with a short term investing horizon.   
 The results of estimating equation (9) for venture-backed versus non-backed firms 
and for the two time periods (τ=1 and τ=2) are reported in Table 7.  Panel A reports the 
results of a univariate estimation while the multivariate analysis after controlling for the 
interaction of reported earnings with other determinants of the earning-return relationship 
(SIZE, LEV, MB, LOSS) is reported in Panel B.  Consistent with the findings in Kothari 
and Sloan [1992] the estimated coefficients θ τ )(1  for both the venture-backed and non-
venture backed firms increase with the time interval over which stock returns are 
computed.  This finding is consistent with the claim that stock prices lead accounting 
earnings.  Our main focus is on the ratio θ
θ
τ
τ
)1(1
)2(1
=
=  that captures the extent to which stock 
prices lead earnings across venture and non-venture backed firms.  The results suggest 
that the ratio θ
θ
τ
τ
)1(1
)2(1
=
= is significantly lower for the venture-backed firms (1.53 for venture 
backed firms versus 1.88 for non-backed firms, and 1.45 versus 1.82 once the control 
variables are included (Panel B)).  This finding is consistent with the view that venture 
capital investors can be characterized as transient owners which are myopically focused 
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on short-term earnings.  This evidence runs contrary to the evidence documented in 
Jiambalvo et al. [2002] who found that institutional investors, as opposed to venture 
capital investors, are not fixated on current reported earnings.   
 
6. Is This Just an “Institutional Investor Effect?” 
Given prior research on the effect on institutional holdings on the informativeness 
of reported earnings, we have repeated the analysis of the earnings-returns relationship 
after controlling for institutional investors holdings.  Even after controlling for 
institutional investors holdings, we continue to find evidence that the reported accounting 
earnings are less informative for venture-backed firms.  This finding suggests that unlike 
institutional investors, venture capital owners decrease the quality of the information 
reported to capital markets participants by the firms they invest in and influence the 
decision making process.   
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 The extant literature by far has documented the benefits of venture capital 
financing.  These benefits range from the valuable strategic advice, business plans and 
industry connections provided by venture capitalists to newly public firms, to the high 
quality of underwriters and the low under pricing of IPOs enjoyed by venture-backed 
firms. Our results suggest that these benefits do not come without costs. 
Our findings suggest that venture capital backed firms have difficulties in credibly 
communicating with investors. We show that the informativeness of public accounting 
information for the pricing of firm equity indeed depends on the ownership structure of 
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the firm. The results are robust to attempts to control for firms’ decision to obtain venture 
capital in the first place. The results are also robust to looking at a sub-sample of more 
homogenous firms, those in high-tech industries. Finally, we adopt an alternative 
methodology to explore whether venture capital backed firms just use alternative 
channels of information to communicate with investors. 
To further explore our hypothesis that venture capitalists manage the flow of 
information to capital market participants we investigate whether firms backed by 
venture capitalists that are more likely to benefit from higher equity prices or that can 
better control firm decisions have less informative earnings. The findings are consistent 
with this view. Overall, these results suggest that venture capitalists might be promoting 
short-term interest given their different investment horizon at the expense of long-term 
investors. 
Taken as a whole the results we present indicate that there is a cost associated 
with being backed by a venture capitalist. Our theory suggests that the conflict of interest 
between long-term equity investors and venture capitalists who seek to promote short-
term performance leads to less informative earnings as one of its attributes. This by itself 
might affect the firm’s ability to raise capital in the future and reduce firm value. 
However, the underlying conflict of interest we emphasize may bring about the 
inefficiency of other firm decisions. The specific test of this assertion is left for future 
research. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Industry Composition and Venture Capital 
Backing for the Sample Period, 1975 – 2003 
 
2 Digit SIC Industry Percent of Venture 
Backed Firms 
1 Crops 0.175 
10 Ores 0.000 
13 Oil and Gas 0.189 
14 Quarry 0.000 
15 Building - Light 0.062 
16 Building – Heavy 0.035 
17 Construction 0.200 
20 Food 0.178 
22 Textile Mill 0.244 
23 Apparel 0.147 
24 Lumber 0.019 
25 Furniture 0.251 
26 Paper 0.306 
27 Printing 0.326 
28 Chemicals 0.319 
29 Petroleum 0.000 
30 Rubber 0.189 
31 Leather 0.000 
32 Stone 0.161 
33 Metal Work - Basic 0.129 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
2 Digit SIC Industry Percent of Venture 
Backed Firms 
34 Metal Work Fabrication 0.264 
35 Industrial 0.556 
36 Electrical 0.499 
37 Transport - Equipment 0.154 
38 Instruments 0.562 
39 Misc. Manufacturing 0.209 
40 Railroad 0.178 
42 Motor Freight 0.327 
44 Water Transport 0.118 
45 Air Transport 0.072 
47 Transport - Services 0.102 
48 Communications 0.349 
49 Utilities 0.240 
50 Durables - Wholesale 0.291 
51 NonDurables  
Wholesale 
0.141 
52 Garden 0.293 
53 General Stores 0.223 
54 Food Stores 0.092 
55 Auto Dealers 0.176 
56 Apparel - Retail 0.211 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
2 Digit SIC Industry Percent of Venture 
Backed Firms 
57 Home Equipment 0.281 
58 Eating 0.232 
59 Misc. Retail 0.231 
60 Commercial Bank 0.025 
63 Hospital and Medical 0.219 
64 Insurance  0.102 
65 Operators Non-
Residence Buildings 
0.131 
67 Real Estate 0.178 
70 Hotels 0.000 
72 Personal Services 0.127 
73 Business Services 0.561 
75 Auto Repair 0.493 
78 Movies 0.126 
79 Amusements 0.157 
80 Health 0.485 
81 Legal Services 0.000 
82 Educational 0.098 
83 Social 0.308 
87 Engineering - Retail 0.363 
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Table 2: Geographic Distribution of Venture Backed IPOs, for the Sample Period, 
1975 – 2003 
 
State Total Number of 
IPOs 
Venture Backed 
IPOs 
California 1424 0.545 
Colorado 159 0.289 
Connecticut 149 0.308 
Florida 298 0.208 
Georgia 164 0.384 
Illinois 218 0.247 
Massachusetts  402 0.554 
Minnesota 172 0.377 
New Jersey 267 0.284 
New York 577 0.171 
Ohio 140 0.242 
Pennsylvania 212 0.353 
Texas 495 0.286 
Virginia 133 0.285 
Washington 122 0.516 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics, Venture Backed Firms versus Non-Venture Backed 
Firms for the Sample Period, 1975-2003 
 
Variable Venture Backed 
(mean) 
Non-Venture 
Backed (Mean) 
T-statistic for 
difference 
Market Value ($mil) 1341.09 605.06 30.27 
Assets ($mil) 406.33 1977.63 12.58 
Sales ($mil) 372.01 634.59 10.52 
Market-to-Book 5.59 3.83 2.88 
Leverage 0.164 0.256 28.60 
Earnings as % 
market value 
0.006 0.011 24.76 
∆Earnings as % 
market value 
0.002 0.004 18.56 
% Earnings<0 0.505 0.272 24.04 
 
Variable Definitions: Assets = firm i’s total assets at the end of year t.  Market-to-book 
ratio = the ratio of firm i’s market value of equity to their book value of equity at the end 
of year.  Leverage = the ratio of firm i’s long term debt to total book value of assets at the 
end of year t-1.  Sales = firm i’s sales revenues in year t; Earnings as % market value = 
firm i’s earnings before extraordinary items in year t scaled by its market value of equity 
at the end of year t-1;   ∆Earnings as % market value = firm i’s earnings in year t minus 
earnings in year t-1, scaled by market value of equity at the end of year t-1;  
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Table 4: Tests of Earnings Informativeness of Venture Backed Firms versus Non-
Venture Backed Firms for the Sample Period 1975-2003 
 
Annual returns-earnings regression 
     
        VC DUMMY         INSTRUMENTS 
Variable  STATE YEAR 
INTERCEPT 0.167 
(46.83) 
0.185 
(48.52) 
0.233 
(55.76) 
EARN 0.881 
(18.21) 
0.885 
(18.05) 
0.879 
(18.99) 
∆EARN 0.551 
(22.33) 
0.423 0.354 
(21.49) 
VC*EARN -0.260 
(-13.99) 
-0.121 
(-12.31) 
-0.272 
(-18.13) 
VC*∆EARN -0.323 
(-15.59) 
-0.172 
(-11.25) 
-0.285 
(-3.61) 
EARN*LOSS -0.419 
(-8.73) 
-0.424 
(-7.92) 
-0.381 
(-8.41) 
EARN*HTECH -0.000 
(-1.42) 
-0.000 
(-1.65) 
-0.000 
(-1.62) 
EARN*SIZE 0.008 
(18.07) 
0.06 
(11.54) 
0.003 
(8.91) 
EARN*MB 0.001 
(2.29) 
0.001 
(4.41) 
0.002 
(5.71) 
EARN*LEV -0.01 
(-3.83) 
-0.01 
(-2.97) 
-0.02 
(-1.86) 
Adj. 2R  0.0695 0.0741 0.095 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Variables definitions: The dependent variable is Ri,t= firm i’s 12-month cumulative raw 
return for fiscal year t.  The 12-month interval starts three months following the end of 
the fiscal year t-1 and ends three months after the end of fiscal year t. EARNi,t = firm i’s 
annual earnings (before extraordinary items) for fiscal year t, scaled by market value of 
equity at the end of fiscal year t-1. ∆EARNi,t = change in EARNi,t between year t-1 and 
year t, scaled by market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
VCi,t= venture capital backing dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is venture 
capital backed, zero otherwise.  LOSSi,t = dummy variable equal to 1 if EARNi,t <0.  
HTECHi,t = dummy variable equal to 1 if SIC code belongs to 2833-2836, 8731-8734, 
7371-7379, 3570-3577,3600-3674.  SIZEi,t = the log of firm’s i market value in year t.   
MBi,t = Market-to-Book ratio, the ratio of firm i’s market value of equity to their book 
value of equity at the end of year.  LEVi,t= firm’s leverage, defined as the ratio of firm i’s 
long term debt to total book value of assets at the end of year t-1. 
Instruments for venture capital backing are state of operation dummies and a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm was founded after 1979.  Heteroskedasticity robust T-
statistics are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Market Reaction to Quarterly Earnings Announcements of Venture 
Backed Firms versus Non-Venture Backed Firms for the Sample Period 1975-2003 
 
Panel A: Reaction to Earnings Announcements, Full Sample     
    VC DUMMY              INSTRUMENTS 
Variable  STATE YEAR 
Intercept 0.006 
(14.49) 
0.006 
(14.48) 
0.006 
(17.78) 
UE 0.201 
(32.69) 
0.204 
(31.47) 
0.212 
(32.21) 
UE*VC -0.068 
(-6.94) 
-0.078 
(-4.61) 
-0.030 
(-3.21) 
    
Adj. 2R  0.022 0.023 0.022 
 
Panel B: The Effect of Firm’s Age on the Informativeness of Earnings, High-Tech 
Sample  
                             VC DUMMY              INSTRUMENTS 
Variable  STATE YEAR 
Intercept 0.006 
(8.02) 
0.006 
(7.44) 
0.006 
(8.76) 
UE 0.252 
(32.69) 
0.249 
(31.47) 
0.257 
(32.21) 
UE*VC -0.222 
(-3.42) 
-0.181 
(-3.61) 
-0.132 
(-2.99) 
UE*AGE -0.006 
(-0.24) 
-0.007 
(-0.87) 
-0.006 
(-0.52) 
UE*AGE*VC 0.067 
(1.96) 
0.071 
(1.92) 
0.061 
(2.01) 
    
Adj. 2R  0.029 0.028 0.027 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Variables definitions: The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal return over the 
three days (-1,1) centered on firm i’s announcement of quarter q earnings for year t. 
UEi,t = the unexpected earnings in firm i’s quarter q, year t earnings announcement, 
measured as reported earnings for quarter q, year t minus reported earnings for quarter q, 
year t-1, divided by market value of equity 30 days prior to the announcement.  AGE is 
the log of number of years since the firm went public.  
Instruments for venture capital backing are state of operation dummies and a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm was founded after 1979.  Heteroskedasticity robust T-
statistics are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 6: The Effect of Venture Capital Ownership and Board of Directors 
Characteristics on Earnings Informativeness for Venture Backed Firms, 1978-1987 
 
Panel A: Annual returns-earnings regressions 
   VC DUMMY           INSTRUMENTS    
Variable                            STATE                YEAR 
Intercept 0.212 
(8.75) 
0.195 
(9.12) 
0.171 
(8.27) 
EARN 0.729 
(5.26) 
0.628 
(4.01) 
0.591 
(4.17) 
∆EARN 0.517 
(9.81) 
0.523 
(5.13) 
0.482 
(5.12) 
EARN*LOSS -0.385 
(-5.45) 
-0.342 
(-4.98) 
-0.324 
(-4.24) 
EARN*HTECH -0.145 
(-2.14) 
-0.187 
(-2.55) 
-0.147 
(-2.78) 
EARN*SIZE 0.005 
(6.24) 
0.004 
(5.87) 
0.004 
(6.57) 
EARN*MB 0.001 
(1.98) 
0.001 
(1.87) 
0.001 
(1.94) 
EARN*LEV -0.021 
(-4.21) 
-0.022 
(-3.98) 
-0.022 
(-3.54) 
EARN*OWN -0.302 
(-2.14) 
 -0.324 
(-1.66) 
∆EARN*OWN -0.032 
(-1.92) 
 -0.034 
(-1.62) 
EARN*SEAT  -0.072 
(-2.24) 
-0.068 
(-2.17) 
∆EARN*SEAT  -0.184 
(-1.98) 
-0.029 
(-1.82) 
   
Adj. 2R  0.0552 0.0554 0.0542 
 39
 
Variables definitions: EARNi,t = firm i’s annual earnings (before extraordinary items) for 
fiscal year t, scaled by market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t-1. ∆EARNi,t = 
change in EARNi,t between year t-1 and year t, scaled by market value of equity at the 
end of fiscal year t-1.   
LOSSi,t = dummy variable equal to 1 if EARNi,t <0.  HTECHi,t = dummy variable equal 
to 1 if SIC code belongs to 2833-2836, 8731-8734, 7371-7379, 3570-3577,3600-3674.  
SIZEi,t = the log of firm’s i market value in year t.  MBi,t = Market-to-Book ratio, the 
ratio of firm i’s market value of equity to their book value of equity at the end of year.  
LEVi,t= firm’s leverage, defined as the ratio of firm i’s long term debt to total book value 
of assets at the end of year t-1. 
OWN = percentage of equity owned by venture capital firms at date of IPO.  SEAT = 
percentage of seats on board of directors occupied by venture capital firms.  
Heteroskedasticity robust T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Market Reaction to Earnings Announcements Conditional on Board and 
Venture Capital Ownership   
  
Variable  
Intercept 0.003 
(1.08) 
0.003 
(0.98) 
0.002 
(0.98) 
UE 0.098 
(7.22) 
0.104 
(7.79) 
0.105 
(7.51) 
UE*OWN -0.006 
(-2.27) 
 -0.001 
(-0.17) 
UE*SEAT  -0.096 
(-3.33) 
-0.092 
(-2.45) 
    
Adj. 2R  0.021 0.020 0.021 
 
Variables definitions: The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal return over the 
three days (-1,1) centered on firm i’s announcement of quarter q earnings for year t. 
UEi,t = the unexpected earnings in firm i’s quarter q, year t earnings announcement, 
measured as reported earnings for quarter q, year t minus reported earnings for quarter q, 
year t-1, divided by market value of equity 30 days prior to the announcement.  OWN = 
percentage of equity owned by venture capital firms at date of IPO.  SEAT = percentage 
of seats on board of directors occupied by venture capital firms.  Heteroskedasticity 
robust T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 7:  Regression Analysis of Stock Returns on Current Earnings with Different 
Time Intervals, Venture Backed Firms and Non-Venture Backed Firms for the 
Sample Period 1975-2003 
υθθ τ
τ
ττ −
−
− ++= it
it
it
tit
P
ER )(10,            (9) 
Panel A: 
 θ τ )1(1 =  θ τ )2(1 =  
θ
θ
τ
τ
)1(1
)2(1
=
=  
Venture 
Backed Firms 
1.091 1.669 1.53 
    
Non-Venture 
backed Firms 
1.213 2.280 1.88 
    
    
 
 
 
Panel B: Including Control variables 
 θ τ )1(1 =  θ τ )2(1 =  
θ
θ
τ
τ
)1(1
)2(1
=
=  
Venture 
Backed Firms 
1.086 1.574 1.45 
    
Non-Venture 
backed Firms 
1.172 2.133 1.82 
    
    
R tit τ−, is the buy-and-hold return for firm i over the period t-τ to t, Eit  is income before 
extraordinary items for the accounting period ended at time t, Pit τ− is the stock price at the end of 
period t-τ.  θ τ )(1  is the capital market’s response to reported earnings.  Panel A reports the results 
of estimating equation (5) for venture backed firms and non-backed firms.  Panel B reports the 
results after controlling for different factors affecting the earnings-returns relationship as LOSS, 
HTECH, SIZE, MB, and LEV.  The ratio θ
θ
τ
τ
)1(1
)2(1
=
=  measures the sensitivity of stock prices to 
current earnings relative to future earnings where a higher ratio represents a lower sensitivity of 
stock returns to current earnings relative to future earnings. 
 
 
